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FISCAL OR MONETARY STIMULUS?  
EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS FOR TAX REFORMS
ABSTRACT. The article deals with the problem of substantiation of the emergent 
economies development regulatory measures (fiscal and / or monetary), using the 
evolutionary modelling methods. For this purpose, the mathematical model was 
constructed that simulates the co-evolution process of the advanced and developing 
countries, linked by global value chains. In this model, each country is characterized 
by its original structure of economic entities, defined by the ratio of the egoistic en-
terprises (predisposed to conservative behaviour) to the altruistic enterprises (predis-
posed to innovation), as well as by specific population and demographic processes. 
The results of the computational experiments have shown that the success of eco-
nomic regulation fundamentally depends on the peculiarities of the initial state of the 
institutional environment. In the institutional environment with the «transparent» 
long behaviour and, accordingly, a long economic planning horizon, the best result in 
the form of average annual production growth rate of the emergent economies is pro-
vided by the cheap money policy combined with the high European taxes. A different 
situation is observed in more realistic short behaviour and, accordingly, short (under 
5 years) economic planning horizon. In this case, any tax policy (neither low nor high 
taxes) together with any money (neither cheap nor expensive), to a certain extent 
loses its significance, as the initially backward innovative system does not allow to 
quickly get good results, and the long-term benefits of the potential economic growth 
are not taken into consideration. However, low taxes and cheap money are important 
as they create better conditions for survival of the altruistic enterprises, facilitating 
their investment activities, which can multiply increase their technical performance 
and economic efficiency. Still, in the context of the evolutionary economics and fol-
lowing the conducted computational experiments, the fiscal policy in terms of emerg-
ing markets retains its regulatory capacity, and therefore requires further reforms in 
the context of the «new reality» based on the global value chains.
KEYWORDS. Fiscal policy; monetary policy; taxes; evolutionary economics; co-
evolution; institutional environment; mathematical model; enterprises; investment; 
economic growth.
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НАЛОГОВОЕ ИЛИ МОНЕТАРНОЕ СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЕ? 
ЭВОЛЮЦИОННЫЕ АРГУМЕНТЫ В ПОЛЬЗУ НАЛОГОВЫХ РЕФОРМ
АННОТАЦИЯ. Статья посвящена исследованию проблемы обоснования мер 
регулирования развития эмерджентной экономики — фискальных и (или) мо-
нетарных, с использованием методов эволюционного моделирования. Для это-
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Introduction
To overcome the consequences of the 
global financial and economic crisis the 
world’s leading countries are widely us-
ing the monetary policy (mainly the quan-
titative easing), as the fiscal policy receded 
into the background and was largely lim-
ited to the procyclical budget austerity 
measures. 
The active actions of the G7 central 
banks did indeed stabilized the situa-
tion. However, fundamentally the global 
issue of the transition to the sustainable 
economic growth has not been solved. As 
it is noted in «The Economist»: «Despite 
central banks’ efforts, recoveries are still 
weak and inflation is low. Faith in mon-
etary policy is wavering. As often as they 
inspire confidence, central bankers sow 
fear. Negative interest rates in Europe and 
Japan make investors worry about bank 
earnings, sending share prices lower. 
Quantitative easing (QE, the printing of 
money to buy bonds) has led to a build-
up of emerging-market debt that is now 
threatening to unwind. For all the cheap 
money, the growth in bank credit has been 
dismal»1.
Such circumstances revive the natural 
interest in more active use of the alterna-
tive fiscal policies aimed at promoting 
the structural reforms in the real sector 
of economy. In particular, J. Stiglitz and 
H. Rashid believe that: «…large increases 
in public investment in infrastructure, 
education, and technology will also be 
needed. These will have to be financed, at 
least in part, by the imposition of environ-
1 Out of ammo? Economist.com, 2016. URL: 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/ 
21693204-central-bankers-are-running-down-
their-arsenal-other-options-exist-stimulate.
го была построена экономико-математическая модель, имитирующая процес-
сы коэволюции развитой и развивающейся стран, связанных через глобальные 
цепочки создания стоимости. В этой модели каждая из стран характеризуется 
собственной исходной структурой экономических субъектов, определяемой со-
отношением предприятий-эгоистов (предрасположенных к консервативному 
поведению) и предприятий-альтруистов (предрасположенных к инновацион-
ному поведению), а также специфическим населением и демографическими 
процессами. Результаты вычислительных экспериментов показали, что успех 
того или иного способа экономического регулирования принципиально за-
висит от особенностей исходного состояния институциональной среды хозяй-
ствования. В институциональной среде с «прозрачными» длинными правилами 
игры и, соответственно, длинным горизонтом хозяйственного планирования 
наилучший результат в виде высоких темпов роста производства в эмерджент-
ной экономике дает политика дешевых денег в сочетании с высокими «евро-
пейскими» налогами. Иная ситуация наблюдается в более реалистичной ситуа-
ции с короткими правилами игры и, соответственно, коротким (не более 5 лет) 
горизонтом хозяйственного планирования. В этом случае любая налоговая по-
литика (низкие или высокие налоги) в сочетании любыми деньгами (дешевыми 
или дорогими), в определенном смысле теряет значение, поскольку изначаль-
но отсталая инновационная система не позволяет быстро получать высокие 
результаты, а преимущества экономического роста в отделенном будущем не 
принимаются во внимание. Вместе с тем, для постепенного формирования луч-
шей инновационной системы низкие налоги и дешевые деньги имеют важное 
значение, поскольку создают лучшие условия для выживания предприятий-
альтруистов, облегчая им инвестиционную деятельность, способную принести 
многократный прирост технической производительности и экономической 
эффективности. В любом случае, в контексте эволюционной экономической 
теории, исходя из проведенных вычислительных экспериментов, налоговая 
политика в условиях эмерджентных рынков сохраняет свой регуляторный по-
тенциал, и, таким образом, требует дальнейшего реформирования в контексте 
«новой реальности», основанной на глобальных цепочках создания стоимости.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА. Фискальная политика; монетарная политика; налоги; 
эволюционная экономика; коэволюция; институциональная среда; математи-
ческая модель; предприятия инвестиции; экономический рост.
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mental taxes, including carbon taxes, and 
taxes on the monopoly and other rents 
that have become pervasive in the market 
economy — and contribute enormously to 
inequality and slow growth» [1]. M. Feld-
stein notes that «…there is no alternative 
to fiscal policy if we want to reverse the 
current downturn» [2]. The IMF experts 
concluded that: «Infrastructure invest-
ment is needed across a range of coun-
tries and should be attractive in a setting 
of very low real interest rates. Countries 
with fiscal space should not wait to take 
advantage of it. …Tax reform, even when 
budget neutral, can create demand if well 
targeted, while simultaneously improving 
labour force participation and enhancing 
social cohesion»2. At the «Communiqué 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors Meeting» it was stated that: 
«Our fiscal strategies aim to support the 
economy and we will use fiscal policy flex-
ibly to strengthen growth, job creation and 
confidence, while enhancing resilience 
and ensuring debt as a share of GDP is on 
a sustainable path. We are also making 
tax policy and public expenditure more 
growth-friendly, including by prioritizing 
high-quality investment»3.
That is one way to look at it. While on 
the other hand, the arguments against the 
active countercyclical fiscal policy remain 
very serious. Its introduction is usually 
associated with high political costs, time 
delays required to change the fiscal pro-
grams, the weak reaction of the economic 
agents to the temporary tax cuts. Besides, 
in the present circumstances, when the 
economies of many countries are close to 
full employment, the government funding 
can crowd out private investment, reduc-
ing the potential productivity growth and 
standards of living, and budget deficits 
automatically increase government debt 
and require higher future taxes to pay the 
2 International Monetary Fund. World Eco-
nomic Outlook: Too Slow for Too Long.  Wash-
ington, April, 2016.
3 Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic 
of China (2016). Communiqué G20 Finance Minis-
ters and Central Bank Governors Meeting. Avail-
able at: http://wjb.mof.gov.cn/pindaoliebiao/
gongzuodongtai/201604/t20160416_1952794.htm.
interest on that debt, which in turn dis-
torts the economic incentives, etc. [2; 3].
Therefore, much depends on how 
well under the specific economic condi-
tions of and considering the stated cir-
cumstances, the fiscal incentives can be 
transformed into the growth of the real 
modern goods and services production, 
which is the accelerator of the sustain-
able economic growth4. Recent researches 
showed that «…in advanced economies, 
stronger planned fiscal consolidation has 
been associated with lower growth than 
expected, with the relation being particu-
larly strong, both statistically and eco-
nomically, early in the crisis. A natural in-
terpretation is that fiscal multipliers were 
substantially higher than implicitly as-
sumed by forecasters» [4]. However, this 
conclusion, even if it is a completely fair 
one, cannot be automatically referred to 
the emerging markets, including Russia, 
where the production potential is limited 
by conventional technologies, the lack of 
modern equipment, STEM-staff and oth-
ers, and many businesses are integrated 
into the Global Value Chains (GVCs) as 
a raw materials supplier or the low pro-
cessed. In such conditions, the selection of 
the best tools of overcoming the recession 
is deeply contested [5].
The fundamental part of the solution 
of this problem is the fact, that due to the 
«past dependence» the GVCs are often 
built so that their innovative science-inten-
sive and, at the same time, environmental-
ly friendly links are located on some ter-
ritories, while the resource-intensive links 
(environmentally unfriendly) are located 
somewhere else [6]. For example, the rela-
tive environmental and economical pros-
perity of the modern Western European 
car producing countries is traditionally 
connected to the low personal income and 
environmental problems in other coun-
tries, which produce coal, ore and smelt 
metal used for the production of these 
cars. In fact this is the coevolution, i.e. a 
historically joint and interdependent de-
velopment of differentiated communities, 
4 http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_
media_upgrade/Who_we_are/Structure/Policy-
making_Organs/Lima_Declaration_RU_web.pdf
Journal of Tax Reform, 2016, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 208–226
211
ISSN 2412-8872
which are further referred to as economic 
and ecological populations, acting within 
their territories, possessing different pro-
cess technologies, environmental condi-
tions, labour and natural resources, and 
directed by different institutes, etc.
On the basis thereof, the purpose of 
this study is to prove what measures of 
national economies development regu-
lation — fiscal and/or monetary and in 
what combination — are better to use in 
order to change the current unfavourable 
situation for many developing countries 
involved in GVCs as auxiliary links.
In this regard, it was required to solve 
the following tasks: 
– to develop and verify a basic model 
the coevolution of two differentiated pop-
ulations, linked by GVCs in the «Emerg-
ing market — Developed market» complex 
(«E — D»);
– to apply fiscal and monetary regu-
lators to the basic model and, basing on 
the computational experiments, to prove 
what measures of coevolution regula-
tion — fiscal and / or monetary — could 
improve the present tendencies.
The economic literature presents a 
number of the economic system evolution 
models: e.g. R. Nelson [7], T. Wiedmann [8], 
J. Van den Bergh [9; 10]. As to the coevolu-
tion mathematical models, they are much 
fewer in number. The review by M. Gual 
[11] and G. Kallis [12] showed that causal 
models of coevolution are used more often 
economically than mathematically.
Considering all the above stated this 
article proposes the model of the coevolu-
tion of different economic and ecological 
populations that uses and develops the 
following ideas of the predecessors:
– economic evolutionists — that the 
economic development is determined 
by the stochastic interaction between the 
economic agents using the mechanisms of 
variability, heredity, and selection;
– financial economists — that the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal and monetary regula-
tions depends on the extent and stage of 
development of manufacturing technolo-
gies and economic institutions5.
5 An important work in this respect is the 
monograph by C. Perez [13].
Development and verification  
of a basic model.  
Cognitive properties of a basic model
There are two territories linked by 
the goods supply chains, each of which 
contains the interaction of two subpopu-
lations: economic subpopulation (rep-
resented by enterprises) and ecological 
subpopulation (represented by human 
population). Together, they constitute the 
overall economic and ecological popula-
tion of the given territory. Thus, we un-
derstand the economic and ecological 
population as a set of economic entities 
(enterprises) and human population, lo-
cated and operating in a separate territory.
Organizational routines of the popu-
lation’s enterprises form their behaviour 
patterns, i.e. the predisposition to act in a 
certain way in a certain kind of situation 
[14]. It is assumed that such patterns can 
be of two types: innovative altruistic pat-
tern and egoistic conservative pattern, so 
hereafter we will relatively divide the en-
terprises on egoists and altruists.
Both altruists and egoists seek to max-
imize their welfare (with due regard to 
the limitations on available resources, the 
monetary and fiscal stimuli and restric-
tions, the established institutions, etc.). 
But the egoists do not consult social inter-
ests, and altruists consider them impor-
tant. That is, the altruists are, in this case, 
the enterprises engaged in risky develop-
ment of new production technologies, tak-
ing into account the social costs incidental 
to the environmental pollution, and there-
fore seek every possible way to improve 
the cleaning system of the emitted pollu-
tion, marshalling their own resources on 
these matters. In turn, the egoists are the 
enterprises, which prefer not to engage in 
the development of new production tech-
nologies, do not take into account the so-
cial costs incidental to the environmental 
pollution, and do not seek to improve the 
emitted pollution cleaning systems6.
6 It is assumed that the egoists, even in case 
of tighter penalties for environmental pollution, 
will not invest into new eco-technologies, and 
prefer to decrease their costs, for example, by 
bribing inspectors, or withdraw from business.
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Economic subpopulation produces 
goods and emits pollution (which is par-
tially removed by the cleaning). Ecologi-
cal subpopulation consumes a part of the 
goods and pollution, and in return sup-
plies the economic subpopulation with 
labour (Fig. 1).
The Figure 1 shows that populations 
are different from one another. 
The first one is located in the Territory 
D and specializes on producing final sci-
ence-intensive products with high added 
value and low pollution level. The orienta-
tion towards innovation development and 
low environmental polluting is prevailing.
The second one, located on the Ter-
ritory E, specializes on producing inter-
mediate resource-intensive products with 
high level of environmental pollution 
emitting. The orientation towards conser-
vative behaviour and indifference to envi-
ronmental pollution is prevailing.
There is a link between the economic 
subpopulations of the territories — the in-
termediate products of the Territory E are 
the input for the final products of the Ter-
ritory D. Both Territories D and E consume 
these products. The ecological populations 
of the Territories D and E do not interact 
(e.g. they do not share borders, or there is 
an emigration control in Territory D).
Pollution, emitted in one territory, 
does not affect the other one (i.e. cannot be 
spread by wind, water, etc.).
Mathematical description  
of the model Economic subpopulation
Production unit. In each of the territo-
ries the production output of the enterprise 
i in the period of t ( )
i
tQ  is determined by 
the following production function
= = ,
i i
i i i i it t
t t t t ti i
t t
Q FQ Lq A f Lq
F Lq      
(1)
Final products
manufacturers
Territory D 
Population
Environmental 
conditions
Intermediate products
manufacturers
Intermediate
demand
Territory E 
Population
Final
products
demand
Pollution
Pollution
Intermediate
supply
Morbidity
Morbidity
Labour
Government
budget
National innovation
system state
R&D
spendings
Labour
Tax
revenue
Capital
produc-
tivity
level
 
Industrial
innovation
Environmental 
conditions
Final
products
demand
Figure 1. Cognitive model of the interaction between economic  
and ecological populations, linked by the goods supply chains
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where itF  is the fixed production assets 
value of the enterprise i in the period of 
t; itA  is the capital productivity; 
i
tf  is the 
capital-labour ratio ( itf const= ); 
i
tLq  is the 
time worked; i is the location number; t is 
the period number.
In addition to the output of products, 
every enterprise is engaged in dispos-
ing the contamination, associated with 
this output, or, figuratively speaking, in 
«cleanness production»:
,
i i
i i i i it t
t t t t ti i
t t
Qa FeQa Le Aa fe Le
Fe Le
+
= =
   
(2)
,i i i it t t tQw Aw fe Le
+
=
 
(3)
,i i i it t t tQl Al fe Le
+
=  (4)
where , ,i i it t tQa Qw Ql
+ + +  are the disposal 
volumes of the air and water emissions, 
and production waste, respectively, in the 
period of t; itFe  is the fixed environmental 
protection assets value of the enterprise i 
in the period t; , ,i i it t tAa Aw Al  are the cap-
ital productivity of fixed environmental 
protection assets; itfe  is the capital-labour 
ratio (for fixed environmental protection 
assets itfe const= ); 
i
tLe  is the amount of 
time worked in the environmental protec-
tion activities.
The supply of the products made 
by the enterprise i during the period of 
t is determined from the following for-
mula:
1 ,
i i i
t t tQ Q Z −= +

 (5)
where 1
i
tZ −  is the unsold product in the 
period of (t – 1):
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
,
,
0,
i i i i
t t t ti
t i i
t t
Q Qr Q Qr
Z
Q Qr
− − − −
−
− −

− >
= 
≤
 

 
(6)
where 1
i
tQr −  is the volume of products 
sold in the period of (t – 1).
The companies are assumed to oper-
ate in a competitive market, i.e. the final 
product pricing is set exogenously (deter-
mined by the volume of aggregative sup-
ply and demand, not by the enterprises 
themselves). Therefore, the enterprise’s 
profit ( itP ) is equal to the difference be-
tween the value of products sold and pro-
duction costs ( itC ) taking into account the 
tax payments (τt)
( )(1 ).i i it t t tP Qr C τ= − −  (7)
To determine itC  it is proposed to use 
the following production function
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
i i i i v
t t t t
i a i w i l
t t t
C Fe F Q k
Qa Qw Ql
ψ ηδ
τ τ τ
= + +
+ − + − + −  
(8)
where _ _ _, ,i i it t tQa Qw Ql  — the environ-
mental contamination by air emissions, 
water emissions and production waste, 
respectively, in the period of t; , ,a w lτ τ τ  
are the environmental tax rates; k is the 
credit interest rate; δ, ψ, ν, τ are the func-
tion parameters.
The Figure 2 shows the procedure of 
distribution of the profit remaining at the 
enterprise’s disposal. 
The profit is expected to be fully di-
rected to the production and environ-
mental protection. But the egoists are just 
simulating the available environmental 
technologies, when the altruists are in-
volved in the development of new green 
technologies.
The number of egoists and altru-
ists within the economic subpopulation 
changes over time as a result of natural 
selection, which alters the subpopulation 
structure.
The condition of their reproduction is 
defined by the following formula: 
,
i
i t
t i
t
PR Rn
C
= ≥
 
(9)
where Rn is the standard level of profit-
ability.
The economic sense of this formula is 
that if the strategy of the economic entity 
(whether it is altruist or egoist) leads to the 
increasing business activity effectiveness, 
then it reproduces enterprises of its own 
kind, which will use the same behaviour 
patterns. If not, then the reproduction 
does not occur.
At the same time, each territory has its 
historically formed level of profitability, 
which is relevant to the specific features of 
its institutional environment.
If itF Fn≤  (where Fn is the standard 
fixed assets value) or the enterprise has 
been standing the losses for the previous 
3 periods ( 0itP < ), then the entity fails (re-
moves itself from the subpopulation).
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Thus, the structure of economic sub-
population is dynamic and may change 
due to the comparative advantages of the 
altruistic or egoistic behaviour.
Both egoists and altruists can direct 
their profits into expanding the existing 
facilities and / or their modernization 
(through simulating the known technolo-
gies or developing new ones). They engage 
in the enterprise modernization only if the 
current profitability rate ( =i i it t tR P C ) is 
lower than a threshold figure (which is suf-
ficient to maintain the business activity). 
The development of the investments 
in expanding the existing capacities causes 
an increase in fixed assets value:
1 1
0
0 0
1 1
0
0
, 0
, 0
i i i
t t t
T T
i i i i
t t t
i
t i i
t t
T
i i i
t t
F NA F I
F D dt I dt P
F
F NA F
F D dt P
− −
− −
 − ⋅ + =
= − + >
= 
− ⋅ == − ≤
∫ ∫
∫
 
(10)
where NA is the amortization rate; itD  is 
the amortization payment; Т is the total 
number of periods.
The amount of investment ( itI ) (see 
Fig. 2) is determined as follows: 
( , , ),i I it t t tI f P D K=
where Kt is the loan proceeds amount 
(Kt = f k(kt)), kt is the average credit rate.
The facilities modernization and the 
research-and-development (R&D) pro-
cess, associated with it, are logically pro-
posed in seminal work by R. Nelson and 
S. Winter [7]. The R&D generates new 
capital productivity values using the two-
stage stochastic process.
The first stage is characterized by in-
dependent random variables dm and dn, 
which can be equal to either 0 or 1. Ac-
cording to the values of these random 
variables enterprise begins (or not) the 
modernization process. 
At the second stage, the probability of 
investment success is estimated:
min
max min
min
max min
_ _
Pr( 1) ;
_ _
_ _
Pr( 1) ,
_ _
i
t t
t t
i
t t
t t
K rm K rmdm
K rm K rm
K rn K rndn
K rn K rn
−
= =
−
−
= =
−  
(11)
where max min_ , _t tK rm K rm  are, corre-
spondingly, the maximum and minimum 
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Figure 2. The scheme of formation and distribution 
 of industrial enterprise investment
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costs for the simulation of known tech-
nologies by the enterprises of the sector 
in the period of t; max min_ , _t tK rn K rn  are, 
correspondingly, the maximum and mini-
mum– costs for the new technologies de-
velopment by the enterprises of the sector 
in the period of t.
Investments, as Figure 2 shows, may 
be directed to the technologies imitation 
and / or technological innovations.
If the enterprise gets an imitation, then 
it should find and imitate the best practice 
in the industry. If the enterprise gets an 
innovation, then it selects a technology, 
proceeding from the technological capa-
bilities distribution in the industry Ant:
( , ),n Ind VVPt t tAn f d d=  (12)
where Indtd  is the industrial contribution to 
GDP; VVPtd  is the R&D spending from the 
government budget.
The latter, in turn, is defined as fol-
lows:
( , ).VVP dt t td f kτ=
The economic sense of this formula is 
that the raising enterprise taxes reduces 
the resources of the enterprises, but in-
creases the government revenues, which 
are directed to the R&D funding among 
other things.
The capital productivity value for the 
enterprises, which got both simulation 
and innovation, is defined by the follow-
ing expression:
1 max( , , ),
i i
t t t tA A A An+ =        (13)
where tA  is the highest (corresponding to 
the best practice) productivity level in the 
sector.
If the enterprise does not get neither 
simulation nor innovation, then the capi-
tal productivity remains the same7. 
As the enterprise evolves, itF  and 
i
tFe  
also change, and therefore in the assump-
tion 0
i i
tf f const= =  changes the total 
amount of labour used i i it t tL Lq Le= + .
7 Enterprises do not know a priori, whether 
their attempts to become innovators (simulators) 
will be justified or not, and specifically what level 
of R&D expenditure they may need. For any of 
them, the answer to this question depends on 
choices made by other enterprises.
The enterprise’s composite demand 
for labour itΛ  is 
.
i i
i i it t
t t ti i
t t
F Fe q e
f fe
Λ = + = Λ + Λ  
     
(14)
The enterprise’s total filled demand 
for labour ( itLf ) is defined by the labour 
market offers in the territory ( itL

):
1
1
1
,
,
,
n
i i i
t t t
i
i i n
t i i it
t t tn
i i
t
i
L
L
L L
=
=
=
Λ ≥ Λ
=  Λ
< Λ Λ
∑
∑
∑
 
   

    
(15)
where n is the number of enterprises (enti-
ties) in the territory.
In turn, the enterprise’s demand for 
production labour is determined by the 
formula
,
.
i i i
t t t
i i
t it
ti
t
q q L
Lq q L
Λ Λ =
= Λ Λ
 


 
(16)
The filled demand for environmental 
activity labour is calculated as follows:
, ,
.
1
i i i
t t t
i i
t it
ti
t
e L
Le q L
Λ Λ =
=   Λ
− Λ 
 
 

 
(17)
Environmental protection. The clean-
ness production results in environmental 
pollution reduction. The pollution balance 
is defined as follows: 
0
0 0
0
0 0
0
0 0
,
T T
i i i i
t t t
T T
i i i i
t t t
T T
i i i i
t t t
Qa Qa Atm dt Qa dt
Qw Qw Wat dt Qw dt
Ql Ql Lan dt Ql dt
− − − +
− − − +
− − − +

= + −
= + − = + −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
where , ,i i it t tQa Qw Ql
− − −  are the balances 
of pollution by air emissions, water emis-
sions and the waste disposal, respectively, 
in the period of t; 
_ _
, ,i i it t tAtm Wat Lan
−  are 
the amounts of pollution by air emissions, 
water emissions and the waste disposal, 
respectively, in the period of t.
(18)
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The calculation of the volumes of pol-
lution by air emissions, water emissions 
and the waste disposal in the period of t, 
is carried out according to the following 
formulas:
( )
( ) ,
( )
i Atm i
t t
i Wat i
t t
i Lan i
t t
Atm f Q
Wat f Q
Lan f Q
− −
− −
− −
 =
=
=  
(19)
where , ,Atm Wat Lanf f f− − − are the pollu-
tion functions.
It is assumed that enterprises only uti-
lize their own pollution.
Ecological subpopulation. As noted 
above, the ecological subpopulation is 
represented by the human population liv-
ing in a given territory (E or D), which is 
divided into four age groups (0–14, 15–24, 
25–64 and over 64 years).
The human population size in dynam-
ics is defined by the formula:
1
1 ,
v v v v v v
t t t t t tPL PL Rb Rd Rs Rs
−
−
= + − + −
where vtPL  is the population in the group 
of ν; vtRb  is the birth rate for the group of 
ν, vtRb const= ; 
v
tRd  is the mortality rate for 
the group of ν; 1 ,v vt tRs Rs
−  is the rate of the 
transition from one age group to the other.
The mortality rate for the relevant 
group of population depends on the ag-
gregated environmental pollution:
_ _ _( , , ).v Rd i i it t t tRd f AQ WQ LQ=
The labour market offers of each ter-
ritory ( itL

):
2 3( ),= +
i l
t t tL f PL PL  (20)
where vtPL  is the population size in the 2d 
and 3d groups.
The interaction between populations. 
The interaction of populations, operating 
within the Territories E and D, goes in the 
following directions.
First, the population of the Territory E 
and D determine the amount of demand 
for the products of the Territory D:
1
( , ),
n
i Q v v
t t t
i
QE f PLE PLY
=
=∑ 
where ,v vt tPLE PLY  are the population 
size in the 2–4 age groups in the Territory 
D and E, respectively.
Secondly, the production volume of 
enterprises in the Territory D depends on 
the production of the enterprises in the 
Territory E. To account this dependence, 
the production of the enterprises in the 
Territory D is adjusted by a factor of (η), 
which is defined by the following logistic 
function:
1 ,
tQY
η
αβ γ= +
where QYt is the total output in the Ter-
ritory E; β, α, γ  are the function’s param-
eters, 0 < β < 1, α > 0, γ > 0.
With proper selection of the function’s 
parameters, the growth of total output in 
the Territory E will provide the value, ap-
proximately equal to 1. At the same time, 
the total output reduction will cause a de-
crease of the rate to 0.
Third, the total output in the Territory 
D determines the demand for products 
manufactured in the Territory E:
( ).t Q tQY f QE=   (21)
The implementation  
of the model, its parameterization  
and verification
The model of populations’ coevolu-
tion has been implemented in the de-
velopment environment AnyLogic 6.08, 
which supports agent based and system 
dynamics simulation (Fig. 3).
Two countries, which may be consid-
ered typical representation of the Terri-
tories D and E, have been chosen as ob-
jects for the model’s parameterization: 
Germany (the advanced economy with 
innovative production technologies and 
institutions, promoting environmentally-
friendly behaviour), and Ukraine (the 
emerging economy with traditional man-
ufacturing technologies and institutions 
promoting environmentally-unfriendly 
behaviour).
Each object is characterized by the 
structure of its economic subpopula-
tion — altruists-egoists ratio (ψ).
During parameterization for each ob-
ject, these ratios have been chosen so that 
8 URL: http://www.anylogic.com/.
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the dynamics and values of the popula-
tions’ developments, determined by the 
behaviour peculiarities of the altruists and 
egoists, respond actual observed trends 
during the entire period of the approxima-
tion (2008–2013) (Table).
Parameterized and verified basic 
model enables the computational experi-
ments, designed to determine the patterns 
of interdependent development of two 
populations of economic subjects with 
different levels of production, innovation 
and environmental activities.
For this purpose, the following com-
putational experiments were carried out:
– А1 — the coevolution continuing 
current trends, when economic popula-
tions of the Territories D and E rely on 
their own production technologies;
– А2 — the European type of coevolu-
tion, when the economic population of the 
Territory E gets the access to the technolo-
gies developed in the Territory D.
Experiment A1 is the coevolution, 
continuing current trends;  
the economic populations  
of the Territories D and E rely  
on their own production technologies
In the assumption on the independent 
development of the production technol-
ogy, the indicators dynamics, characteriz-
ing the situation in the Territories E and D, 
have different trends.
The Territory D has been showing 
steadily increasing production output 
(average annual growth rate of +2,0 %) 
(Fig. 4) and decreasing total resident pop-
ulation size, which is not related to the 
environmental pollution (–0,06 %) (Fig. 5), 
and the gradual reduction of anthropo-
genic impact on the environment (Fig. 7). 
It comes from the fact that in the Territory 
D the enterprises with advanced produc-
tion technologies and altruistic (innova-
tive) behaviour type (ψ = 0,55), which are 
accustomed to the permanent production 
modernization (which positively reflect-
ing on the capital productivity dynam-
ics — Fig. 6), and also take into account 
social costs related to the environmental 
pollution and therefore seek to improve 
the ways of emitted pollution cleaning, 
are prevailing.
The Territory E has also been show-
ing the decreasing total resident popu-
lation size at the rate of (–0,15 %) dur-
ing the simulated period, but it can be 
explained by increasing anthropogenic 
impact on the environment — the av-
erage annual pollution growth rate (as 
opposed to the Territory D) is positive. 
This in turn causes the decrease in the 
working-age population and labour 
shortages, which results in the long-
term decrease in production output. In 
addition to the stated factor and general 
low production technology level, the 
reason is the prevailing in the Territory 
E is egoistic enterprises with conserva-
tive behaviour, which seek quick results 
to the detriment of innovative future, 
and do not take into account the envi-
ronmental pollution spillovers.
Model’s verification results  
(mean values for 2008–2013)
Parameter Unit Ukraine Germany 
Actual Estimated Deviation Actual Estimated Deviation
Resident population size % 100,0 98,9 –1,1 100,0 99,6 –0,4
Industrial output % 100,0 102,8 +2,8 100,0 91,9 –8,1
Stationary air pollution % 100,0 91,8 –8,2 100,0 100,0 0,0
Water body pollution % 100,0 105,6 +5,6 100,0 105,7 +5,7
Industrial pollution % 100,0 106,8 +6,8 100,0 89,6 –10,4
Mean absolute deviation pp – – 4,9 – – 4,9
The statistical data (population size, production output, research and development expenditures, 
environmental pollution level, etc.) used for the model parameterization is obtained from the websites: 
URL: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua; URL: http://data.un.org; http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org; URL: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; http://apps.who.int.
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Figure 7. Experiment А1. Expected 
industrial waste dynamics  
(base index)
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Figure 6. Experiment А1. Expected 
capital productivity dynamics  
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Figure 5. Experiment А1. Expected 
resident population dynamics 
(chain index)
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Figure 4. Experiment А1. Expected 
production output dynamics  
(base index)
Experiment А2 — the European type  
of coevolution; the economic population 
of the Territory E gets the access  
to the technologies developed  
in the Territory D
If the economic population E gets the 
access to the advanced foreign technolo-
gies, then the territorial development pa-
rameters change drastically. Now, the 
economic population (the industrial enter-
prises of the Territory E) has the ability to 
occasionally copy, and then after a while 
to replicate massively these technologies, 
which results in productivity growth of the 
production and environmental activity, the 
increase in production output (Fig. 8), and 
better cleaning of emitted environmental 
pollution. As a result, the ecological popu-
lation situation improves, which reflects 
positively on the resident population size 
dynamics of the Territory E (Fig. 9).
However, it should be noted that the 
results obtained in the experiment A2 are 
rather a demonstration of the capacity of 
the European development vector, than 
real policy for the Territory E.
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In order to simulate technologies suc-
cessfully (and especially to create them), 
the appropriate scientific and techno-
logical potential is required (a rather high 
level of scientific and technological cul-
ture, qualified personnel, innovation tra-
ditions, etc.), which enables the country 
to open the window of opportunities in 
using technological experience of more 
advanced countries. The dynamics of all 
these processes is well described in the 
well-known monograph by C. Perez [13]. 
The common principle is that the ability to 
copy and mass-replicate new technologies 
depends on the recipient’s scientific and 
technical development, which, in turn, is 
determined by the cumulative (for many 
years) R&D expenditures of the govern-
ment and enterprises. As noted by V. De-
mentyev [15], there is a certain threshold of 
initial scientific and technical knowledge, 
failing which they raise the marginal costs 
infinitely large. And conversely, the higher 
initial knowledge is the easier it gets to ac-
quire additional knowledge [15, p. 37].
As is known, the total R&D level in 
the emergent countries is substantially 
lower than in advanced countries. But sev-
eral post-Soviet economies retained the 
national scientific and technical potential 
(especially in the military-industrial com-
plex). It is obvious that the capacity devel-
opment through expansionary economic 
policy will improve both the generation 
of its own scientific and technological de-
velopment and, more importantly for the 
emergent markets, enhance the ability of 
economic agents to adopt foreign technol-
ogy (reducing the time required for learn-
ing to use and further mass replicate by 
the formulas 10–13).
Using the model to choose  
the adjustment policy:  
fiscal and/or monetary tools
The government of the Territory E has 
two main tools of stimulation the innova-
tive economic development of the popu-
lation: fiscal and monetary policy, the im-
pact of which we will analyse further.
Within the model, they function the 
following way.
Fiscal policy reduces the total tax 
rate9 (τ↓):
– τ1↓ — increasing enterprises’ earn-
ings — increasing intramural technology 
development costs;
– τ2↓ — changing amounts of tax pay-
ments — changing government R&D fi-
nancing.
9 It this paper to determine the tax impact on 
economic processes we use the total tax rate indi-
cator, introduced by the experts from PwC and 
World Bank Group (2015, p. 126), which describes 
the taxes and other mandatory contributions of 
the enterprise as a share of its profit.
Figure 9. Experiment А2.  
Average population decrease rate  
in the Territory E (chain indexes)
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There is no unambiguous prior an-
swer on how the change in tax rate will 
affect the tax payments, whether they 
will increase or decrease. This is a specific 
question, which relates to the Laffer prob-
lematics (the tax base elasticity by the tax 
rate). The same applies to changes in the 
R&D government financing by the chang-
es in tax revenues. Typically, for various 
reasons this dependence is absent, as far 
as additional revenues can, technically, 
be directed anywhere (within the law). 
Therefore, our simulation is based on a 
neutral hypothesis of unit elasticity: 
– the x % increase in tax leads to a pro-
portional x % increase in the tax base;
– the x % income change leads to a 
proportional x % change in each type of 
government expenditures, including x % 
change in R&D expenditures.
Monetary policy reduces mean inter-
est rate (k↓):
– k1↓ — increasing enterprises’ profit 
by interest savings — increasing intra-
mural technology development costs — 
increasing tax payment amounts (for a 
given tax rate) — increasing government 
R&D financing;
– k2↓ — increasing investment, fi-
nanced by credits loans — increasing en-
terprises’ profit — increasing intramural 
technology development costs — increas-
ing tax payment amounts (for a given tax 
rate) — increasing government R&D fi-
nancing;
– k3↓ — increasing inflation — de-
creasing government R&D financing (real 
terms).
As the case of tax reduction, the in-
terest rate reduction has an ambiguous 
impact on the volume of the government 
R&D financing, because, on the one hand, 
they may be increased due to revenue and 
thus the enterprise’s tax payments growth 
and, on the other hand, they may be de-
creased in real terms due to the fact that 
the reduction of the official discount rate 
in the Territory E which determines the in-
terest rates is related to the increasing in-
flation risks. Generally, it is a paraphrase 
of the aforementioned Laffer problemat-
ics, but only on the dependence of tax base 
on the interest rate. In this case, the sign 
and degree of this dependence are deter-
mined by the analysis of data for past pe-
riods.
Using this logic, further the simula-
tion of the impact of τ and k on the co-
evolution of the economic and ecological 
populations in terms of long and short 
planning horizons (long and short behav-
iour) is carried out:
– B1 is the fiscal and monetary regula-
tions of the coevolution in terms of long 
term planning horizon;
– B2 is the fiscal and monetary regula-
tions of the coevolution in terms of short 
term planning horizon.
Experiment B1 — fiscal and monetary 
regulations of the coevolution in terms 
of long term planning horizon
The calculations start with a social 
discount rate equal to zero. With such 
rate, the present value of its future rev-
enue is equal to that of the present. This 
means that, following the population ap-
proach he performed calculations allow 
to take into account the long-term effects 
of the regulation of economic and ecologi-
cal populations coevolution, and to serve 
the interests of future generations. At the 
same time, the planning horizons of eco-
nomic entities coincide with the duration 
of calculation period (50 years).
Basing on these assumptions, the pur-
pose of this experiment is to find those val-
ues of the variables (τ and k) at which the 
objective function (discounted production 
output) tends to the maximum under the 
following variables restrictions10:
10 The following values of variables were 
used in calculation: (1) TN = 0,01 (2) R&D spend-
ing — from 0,76 % GDP (Ukraine, average for 
2005–2014) to 2,10 % GDP (The euro region, av-
erage for 2005–2014); source: The World Bank. 
World Development Indicators & Global Devel-
opment Finance; (3) interest rates — from 17 % 
(Ukraine, average for 2005–2014) to 5 % (data on 
Italy for 2005–2014, recent data on other countries 
is unavailable, but before the financial crisis of 
2008–2009, Germany and France had the same 
rates); source: The World Bank. World Develop-
ment Indicators & Global Development Finance; 
(4) total tax rates — from 52,2 % of profit (Ukraine 
2015) to 40,6 % of profit (the UN 2015, the rates 
for other years were similar); source: PwC, World 
Bank Group, Paying Taxes.
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where b is the discounting rate; TN — is 
minimal required compound annual 
growth rate of the production output.
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Figure 10. Experiment B2. Comparative 
dynamics of production outputs  
(base index) in the Territory E under 
«long behaviour»
The results of the optimization calcu-
lations on the assumption of «long behav-
iour» showed that the policy, promoting 
the economical growth best (Fig. 10), is the 
cheap money policy, which gives the eco-
nomic population the best investment ac-
cess to savings, and high European taxa-
tion, which provides the government with 
the ability to consistently build and main-
tain a high level of R&D expenditures, 
thereby contributing into accelerating the 
development and localization of imported 
technologies. In fact, such conclusion may 
be considered expected. After all, in order 
to achieve high economic growth rates, 
catching up the advanced economies, it is 
necessary to gradually build up an inno-
vation friendly institutional environment, 
which, along with other features, is char-
acterized by cheap money and relatively 
high taxes, by which the advanced econo-
mies maintain their high development 
level of health care, education, science, 
culture, etc. 
Experiment B2 — fiscal and monetary 
regulations of the coevolution in terms 
of short term planning horizon
In this computational experiment the 
discounting rate is b = 0,3. With such dis-
counting rate ≈ 80 % of the discounted 
cost results (Pareto distribution) fall on the 
first five years of accounting period, and ≈ 
20 % only fall on all the other years. This 
means that, in practice, for the decision-
makers, only the first 5 years of the activity 
do really matter. The planning horizon for 
economic entities of the given population 
is limited by the period, usually coincid-
ing with the normal duration of the presi-
dential term. Basically, it is a political (not 
economic) planning horizon, well reflect-
ing current public life reality in Ukraine, 
where each central regime change causes 
a radical change in the strategic course of 
the state and the dominant rules of «the 
game». Therefore, nothing, happening 
beyond this horizon, is so important for 
making important decisions.
The results of the optimization cal-
culations on the assumption of «short 
behaviour» showed that there are no op-
timal values of the variables τ and k ex-
ist. That is, any combination of monetary 
and fiscal policy τ↓k↓; τ↓k↑; τ↑k↓; τ↑k↑ does 
not provide the increase (compared to the 
base A2) in minimum required annual 
economic growth (TN ≥ 1 %). Therefore, 
under such conditions, the potential of the 
state economic regulation is levelled off by 
the politically motivated business invest-
ment «myopia», which results, regardless 
of the government actions, in no hope for 
acceleration of the innovation economic 
growth in the Territory E.
However, this does not mean that the 
developed model has nothing to offer in 
the situation, well corresponding to the 
current institutional reality in Ukraine. In 
this context it is worth recalling that, in 
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this paper, we proceed not from the usual 
neo-classical presentation, but from the 
evolutionary (population) paradigm that 
links the achieved results to the activity of 
the entities, generating those results.
If the population of enterprises is vi-
able, then there will be some results, and 
if the population of enterprises is gradu-
ally dying out, sooner or later, the results 
will disappear too. It follows that the 
neoclassical entity utility maximization is 
insufficient (even taking into account the 
usual constraints on resources, rationality, 
institutions, etc.). This is just the presup-
position of the behaviour of a single entity 
(person) to model the population.
But in the long-term evolutionary 
context, the entity itself is not important, 
but the growing (at least relatively) popu-
lation of entities is, which also gives the 
chance to survive to those who adhere to 
innovation (altruistic, cooperative) behav-
iour. After all, according to the theory of 
multilevel (group) selection, the frequen-
cy of altruists in a structured population is 
determined by two factors: the individual 
selection within subpopulations (groups), 
which is unfavourable for altruists-coop-
erators, and the group selection, which is 
cooperative subpopulations «friendly». 
Consequently: «Selfishness beats altruism 
within groups. Altruistic groups beat self-
ish groups» [16, p. 335].
The computational experiments 
showed that in terms of the short plan-
ning horizon of economic entities, the pol-
icy, that is most conducive to the growth 
of their population, involves a combina-
tion of cheap money and low taxes τ↓k↓ 
(Fig. 11).
However, it is important to point 
out that such a policy can only be a first 
step in the long-term economic growth-
focused national strategy. In the future, 
to ensure accelerated development of the 
Territory E through the windows of op-
portunities, which open for the localiza-
tion of the European process technolo-
gies, it will be necessary to introduce the 
higher European taxes, only by gradually 
replacing the short political planning ho-
rizon with the long economic one. That 
is the raise in taxation should follow the 
formation of new institutional environ-
ment, based on the following: the stable 
rules of economic relations, long enough 
for the creation and commercialization of 
new technologies; the high costs of the 
rent-seeking behaviour and corruption; 
the government’s ability to be a «techno-
cratic» one and to direct the social rev-
enue growth to the healthcare, education, 
R&D and not to their own needs, to serve 
the community at large, rather than the 
officials running the economy or rent-
seeking businessmen.
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Figure 11. Experiment B2. The dynamics and structure of the economic population 
of the Territory E under «short behaviour» with cheap money and low taxes
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Conclusions
1. To overcome the consequences of 
the global financial and economic crisis 
and to shift to the sustainable economic 
growth, the developed nations mostly use 
the monetary policy tools. However, the 
achieved results, which are far from being 
great, put a more active use of the alterna-
tive fiscal policy tools on the agenda. The 
developing countries also face the chal-
lenge of such a choice, but it is even more 
difficult, because in the process of interac-
tion with the developed economies, many 
of them entrenched in the global value 
chains as auxiliary units specialized in 
the production of raw materials and low 
processing degree products. And this, in 
its turn, imposes additional restrictions on 
the ability of the successfully solving the 
economic growth issues.
Therefore, in view of the indicated 
circumstances, to justify the choice of 
the best methods of economic processes 
regulation, which can change for the 
better the situation between intercon-
nected and interdependent economies, 
this paper did not use the usual neoclas-
sical methodology, but the evolution-
ary methodology based on the idea of 
studying the patterns of co-development 
(coevolution) of the differentiated eco-
nomic and ecological populations, which 
function within the separate territories, 
under specific labour and natural re-
sources, production technologies and en-
vironmental conditions, are lead by spe-
cial institutions resulting from the «path 
dependence», etc.
2. It was suggested to present the de-
velopment patterns of the economic and 
ecological populations, using the agent 
based and system dynamics modelling, 
which simulates the processes of their co-
evolution. In this model each population 
is characterized by its original structure of 
economic entities, defined by the relation 
of the egoistic enterprises (predisposed to 
conservative behaviour) to the altruistic 
enterprises (predisposed to innovation), 
as well as by specific population and de-
mographic processes. Moreover, the pop-
ulation, specializing in the production of 
final products with low environmental 
costs, is characterized by high proportion 
of altruistic enterprises, when the popula-
tion, which specializes in the production 
of intermediate products with high envi-
ronmental costs, has a high proportion of 
egoistic enterprises.
It is important to mention that this 
model is not designed to describe the 
quantitative economic growth only, but to 
analyse its evolutionary processes in the 
form of changes in the initial structure of 
economic entities (egoistic and altruistic 
enterprises) which, in turn, determines 
the change of the population’s dominant 
institutions.
3. The simulation of the coevolution 
processes of two differentiated economic 
and ecological populations, connected 
through GVCs in the production com-
plex «Emerging market — Developed 
market» («E — D»), has shown that their 
spontaneous development can have hard 
negative impact on the entire system, 
which is determined by the fact, that the 
problems of the less developed territory 
through the supply chains, extend to the 
other members of the GVC, placed in the 
safe territory. To avoid such unfavour-
able developments, fraught with increas-
ing global instability, the two types of 
regulatory tools — fiscal and monetary 
tools, which are used at the same time by 
the government in the Territory E, have 
been considered.
In particular, the following tools were 
considered:
– fiscal policy — the total tax rate re-
duction;
– monetary policy — the mean credit 
rate reduction.
Both tools influence (through different 
transmission mechanisms) the enterpris-
es’ profits, investments, taxes, amounts of 
government R&D funding and, eventu-
ally, the economic growth.
4. The results of the computational 
experiments have shown that the success 
of economic regulation fundamentally 
depends on the peculiarities of the initial 
state of the institutional management en-
vironment.
In the institutional environment with 
the «transparent» long behaviour and, 
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accordingly, a long economic planning 
horizon (at zero social discount rate), the 
best result in the form of average annual 
production growth rates of the emergent 
economies is provided by the cheap mon-
ey policy (low credit interest rates) com-
bined with the high European taxes. With 
such planning horizon, the taxation bur-
den reduction is not as important, from 
the national standpoint, as the provision 
of high tax revenues, directed to the ad-
vanced development of the R&D sector.
In other words, in terms of initially 
backward innovation system, the enter-
prises’ investment in the production mod-
ernization provide lower returns than 
government R&D investment, allowing 
the accelerated development and localiza-
tion of advanced foreign technologies.
A different situation is observed in 
more realistic short behaviour and, ac-
cordingly, short (under 5 years) economic 
planning horizon (with politically mo-
tivated discount rate). In this case, any 
tax policy (neither low nor high taxes) 
together with any money (neither cheap 
nor expensive), to a certain extent loses its 
significance, as the initially backward in-
novative system does not allow to quickly 
get good results, and the long-term ben-
efits of the potential economic growth are 
not taken into consideration.
5. However, the low taxes (except for 
the tax on negative externality) and cheap 
money are important for the gradual de-
velopment of better innovation system, 
because, all other things being equal, they 
create better conditions for the altruistic 
enterprises, facilitating their investment 
activities and increasing the probability of 
meeting the innovative «black swan» [17], 
which can multiply increase their techni-
cal performance and economic efficiency. 
This will result in the improving economic 
population’s structure by growing share 
of the economic entities adhering to inno-
vation (altruistic, cooperative) behaviour, 
and in the increased population’s viability. 
And that, finally, along with the favour-
able institutional environment of econom-
ic activity is essential for the sustainable 
economic and social development.
Anyway, in the context of the evo-
lutionary economics and following the 
conducted computational experiments, 
the fiscal policy in terms of emergent mar-
kets retains its regulatory capacity, and 
therefore requires further reforms in the 
context of the «new reality» based on the 
global value chains. However, due to the 
relatively unbalanced economic popula-
tions’ structures, the large-scale fast re-
sults should not be expected from such 
actions.
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